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Discussant's Response to 
How Not to Communicate Material and 
Immaterial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls 
Alan N. Certain 
Price Waterhouse 
Born, I believe, in response to the SEC's post-FCPA proposal to require 
management and auditor reporting on internal accounting controls, principally 
to provide the Commission an objective summary of the likely results of any 
rule it might adopt, Dr. Wallace's survey lives on to explain the difficulties 
management and auditors face when trying to describe internal accounting 
controls to the "stakeholders" of a business enterprise. 
To cynically summarize the survey (in words somewhat different from 
those of Dr. Wallace), I read it to give evidence supporting four points: 
Point one—When given facts about control conditions within an enter-
prise, people—even such sophisticated users of financial and accounting 
data as the nine groups surveyed—place greatly varying interpretations 
on the facts. 
Point Two—Point One doesn't matter, because people—even such 
sophisticated users of financial and accounting data as the nine groups 
surveyed—don't want the facts. They want a summary overview or 
opinion from someone else. 
Point Three—-When "someone else"—and so far this has been manage-
ment, through the new breed of responsibility reports that proliferated 
after the recommendations of the Cohen Commission and the FEI— 
does summarize an enterprise's control responsibilities, it is likely to be 
in language that is sometimes technically incorrect and always subject to 
the same varying interpretations as are the underlying facts. 
Point Four— Point Three is not surprising, since the survey evidence 
supporting Point One demonstrates a great diversity of opinion about 
the facts of the effectiveness of internal controls and about the effects of 
various so-called control weaknesses, even among the preparers 
themselves, the preparers of the responsibility reports cited in Point 
Three. 
Overall, Dr. Wallace's survey and analysis bear out the title of her paper. 
None of the methods implemented so far to disclose information about an 
enterprise's internal accounting control—whether a recitation of control 
weaknesses, a report by management of strengths and weaknesses, or an 
opinion by management—is likely to be successful in communicating a uniform 
message. One suggested communications device—an auditor's opinion—has 
yet to be tested in practice, but I'll have more to say about that device. 
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Future Prospects 
However, this entire issue of the best methodology to report on internal 
accounting controls may be moot today. I say that because of current SEC 
inactivity in the area, and because of my belief in two points of human nature. 
The points are, first, people tend to devote a majority of their attention to 
those matters they believe are most important to their well-being, with balance 
between long-term and short-term effects. My belief in this point leads me to 
the conclusion that, by and large, in the period immediately before the SEC's 
post-FCPA proposal, managements were satisfied that there was a proper 
cost/benefit relationship for control documentation and disclosure. 
The second point of human nature I believe in is that, in the short term at 
least, criticism from others, particularly critics who have the power to enforce 
their views on the individual, diverts the individual's attention to quelling those 
criticisms. My belief in this point is consistent with observed activity during the 
years since enactment of the FCPA of 1977. The SEC's proposal to require a 
management report on internal accounting controls, together with an audit 
opinion on such report, stimulated activity in the early part of this period. 
However, with the release of ASR 278 in June 1980,1 believe we began to see 
a diminution of management's concern with this subject and of management's 
devotion of resources to strengthening internal accounting control. ASR 305, 
issued in January 1982, states, in essence, that the SEC is satisfied that the 
private sector has responded appropriately and that no regulatory disclosures 
are required. In my view, we have already seen the majority of developments 
in public disclosures of internal accounting control. I doubt that we'll see much 
auditor attestation in public reports. 
And in my view, the current status of public disclosure of internal 
accounting control is not deficient. Dr. Wallace's survey tells me that people-
even sophisticated users—aren't really interested in knowing a lot about 
internal accounting controls in business enterprises. And if I'm wrong—if 
knowledgeable users of internal accounting control data really want it, and 
really want auditor involvement—I believe the forces of the market will bring 
forth the level of disclosure wanted by the users. 
Half of the top 100 companies and a significant percentage of other large 
companies do have management responsibility reports addressing internal 
accounting control. The SEC, in ASR 305, expresses satisfaction, not dismay, 
with the diversity of language found in these reports. A few of these companies 
have already included auditor opinions. If such information is truly useful, this 
fact should become apparent to other providers and they should raise their 
standards. In other words, I don't believe Gresham's Law applies to public 
financial reporting. But the cost/benefit ratio must be positive. 
Let's assume, for purposes of further discussion, that users do want more 
reporting on internal accounting controls. What form should the reporting take? 
Report Preferences 
Dr. Wallace's survey presented eight possible forms. The preferences of 
preparers and users, I think, are interesting. Dr. Wallace presented the 
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alternatives alphabetically. I've rearranged them in ascending order from least 
expensive to most expensive and compared the preference rankings. (See 
Exhibit.) You might take some minor exception to the precise order of least 
expensive to most expensive, but I expect that in most cases you wouldn't 
want to alter an item by more than one place in the table. 
Exhibit 
A Cost/Benefit Comparison of 
Internal Accounting Control Reports 
Reporting Basis Preference Rank 
Preparers Users 
Least Expensive 
F. Management's opinion without auditor in-
volvement 1 4 
C. Management's description of controls, without 
auditor involvement 6 2 
D. Auditor's Letter of Recommendations (weak-
nesses) 7 6 
E. Auditor's listing of both strengths and weak-
nesses 8 7 
G. Management's opinion, with materiality limits, 
attested to by auditor 2 5 
A. Auditor's opinion with materiality limits 3 1 
H. Management's opinion without materiality 
limits, attested to by auditor 4 8 
B. Auditor's opinion without materiality limits 5 3 
Most Expensive 
In my view, the preferences of the preparer group are the most telling 
ones. I say that, of course, because I'm a member of the preparer group. My 
interpretation of the preference ranking for preparers is that preparers believe, 
first of all—and this is supported by Dr. Wallace's analysis, also—that an 
overall summary or opinion, rather than details, is preferred. But, second, my 
analysis says preparers believe that the benefits are of such doubtful quantifica-
tion, that the less costly the approach, the more desirable the results. I agree. 
In other words, the rankings one to five of the preparer group are all summary 
disclosures, leading from least expensive to most expensive. And their last 
choices are the ones which involve a lot of details. 
The user group is less clear in its message. But, except for the anomaly of a 
preference ranking of 2 for report Form C, the users also demonstrate a 
preference for summaries or opinions, rather than for details. 
At the present time, the form and extent of internal accounting control 
disclosure is controlled by the preparer groups, and the present predominant 
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disclosure of internal accounting control is Form F. If we're going to have more 
disclosure, in the present voluntary climate, it will be the preparers—the board 
of directors, management and auditors—who determine the form of such 
expansion. 
Looking again to the preference ranking, it seems most likely that the next 
step might be auditor attestation of a management opinion with materiality 
limits (Rank 2) and this, I believe, was Dr. Wallace's conclusion as well, from 
much more rigorous analysis. 
Possibilities if Auditors Involved 
If we are going to have more involvement of auditors, what form should it 
take? In my view, auditor involvement has four aspects which I call "Documen-
tation," "Evaluation," "Verification," and "Attestation." 
Statements on Auditing Standards, particularly SAS No. 30, provide a good 
starting point for auditor involvement. However, I note that little published 
reporting has appeared so far. I've seen no comprehensive surveys, but 
anecdotal evidence suggests that existing reports have been issued in conjunc-
tion with audits that already were compliance-test oriented and where the 
incremental cost was in the range of 5-10%. In other cases, where greater 
expansion of effort would be required (say in the 25% and more of audit fees 
range) auditors have not been retained to report on controls. 
I do believe, though, that while it's a good foundation, SAS 30 rests in part 
on the pragmatic fact that control systems, by and large, are inadequately 
documented. This comes out in the provision of SAS 30 that mandates a 
method of documentation as a basis for common understanding between 
management and the auditor, while acknowledging this documentation might be 
prepared by the auditor himself. While this approach works for reporting on the 
past, it offers no comfort as to expectations for the future. 
Internal control reporting is clearly future oriented. While it has been 
correctly said that the projection of evaluation into the future is subject to the 
risks that conditions will change and that the degree of compliance will 
deteriorate, and while these are valid risks, they simply point up the 
importance of proper documentation. Without proper documentation, the 
internal accounting control system is, as I call it, "personage dependent." 
Documentation makes the system "personage independent." Without docu-
mentation of the system, the loss of a key employee—that is, the only one with 
knowledge of the workings of systems or subsystems within that person's 
sphere of responsibility—creates a void in the control system that must first be 
recognized by others before it can be corrected. Since, in most organizations, 
people tend to not fully understand what other people do outside their 
immediate proximity, the absence of a procedure completed by a departed 
person may, in fact, not even be noticed until the condition has become 
irretrievably lost. With proper documentation, the system is personage 
independent and can recover, though its proper functioning may suffer for a 
time. 
Importance of Documentation 
For these reasons, I believe documentation of control systems is by far the 
number one requirement for the reliability of control systems with a future 
orientation. 
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Documentation should have four dimensions: 
First, there should be documentation of each type of transaction, showing 
each procedure and control step to be performed all the way from inception to 
ultimate recording in the enterprise records. The typical flow chart is 
representative of this kind of documentation. 
Second, a proper evaluation depends on consideration of all the accounting 
and control functions performed by an individual. This documentation is often 
called a job description. We might consider these to be individual inclusionary 
controls. 
Third, and of equal importance, are exclusionary controls. To illustrate: 
Jones may reconcile the bank account and have no other assigned cash 
responsibilities. This would seem to be a good segregation of duties and a 
strong control. However, if Jones could obtain blank check stock without 
detection, the control is abrogated. The fact that the organization chart and job 
description indicate that Jones is independent loses its significance. This is why 
exclusionary controls, such as locked cabinets, restricted access areas and 
computer terminal ID's and passwords are so important. And without complete 
documentation of the system, these flaws can be overlooked for years. 
Work Plans are the fourth dimension of the control documentation process. 
Work Plans outline procedures to be carried out or reports to be prepared on 
each day of the accounting period. A quarterly closing schedule, which is used 
to assure management that all the analyses and judgments required for 
preparation of financial statements have been completed, is a prime example of 
such a Work Plan. 
Internal Control Evaluation and Verification 
The evaluation stage of the process is adequately described in Statements 
on Auditing Standards, also. It consists of a searching contemplation of existing 
conditions looking for weaknesses. A common approach to the search is for the 
auditor to ask, "If I wanted to circumvent the system without detection, how 
could I do it?" The underlying rationale of this approach is that, by identifying 
all avenues to deliberately defeat the system, the auditor will also have covered 
accidental exposures. I observe without further comment that the enunciation 
of this "how can I beat it" view is probably a major contributor to the 
continuing view of many users that the detection of fraud is a primary purpose 
of an audit—a view that is apparent in responses to Dr. Wallace's survey. 
Evaluation can be made of a system that is poorly documented. But that 
evaluation is much more biased toward the past than an evaluation of a well-
documented system of internal accounting control Further, evaluation of a 
poorly-documented or undocumented system is a process that must be 
repeated from the ground up each time a conclusion is needed. The evaluation 
of a well-documented system, on the other hand, increases in reliability each 
time it is done because the auditor is able to build upon prior knowledge, 
perhaps exploring relationships between duties that were previously over-
looked. 
The verification phase, likewise, is adequately covered in Statements on 
Auditing Standards. While extensive compliance testing is certainly not 
employed in all audits, the procedures are familiar and the implications of the 
test results are understood. 
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Reporting on Internal Control 
The attestation or reporting phase is the final one, and is one where, in my 
view, more information than provided by SAS 30 should be conveyed. The user 
should have access to more information than simply the final statement that the 
auditor is satisfied there are no material weaknesses in the internal accounting 
control system. By this, I don't mean we should remove materiality considera-
tions, but rather, I mean the user should be told a little more about the basis of 
the opinion. 
Again, in my view, the most significant factor is the extent of documenta-
tion, and the report should include information about it. One approach might be 
to define a term "gross transaction volume" as the sum of all debit and credit 
changes in all accounts during the period under examination and then to 
address an opinion to the adequate documentation of systems controlling X 
percentage of gross transaction volume. 
In conclusion, I believe Dr. Wallace's survey and analysis clearly summa-
rize the diversity of viewpoints between users and preparers and within groups 
on the subject of internal accounting control reporting. I agree that the 
approaches studied in the paper show clearly "How Not to Communicate 
Material and Immaterial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls." If further 
expansion of disclosure does develop, auditors stand ready to participate, but 
there is a great need for better systems documentation to provide a basis for 
future-oriented evaluation. 
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